The Rule of Law in Negotiations with the EU: Why There Can Be No Compromises

The public often perceives European integration merely as a list of steps and criteria that must be fulfilled in order to advance towards membership in the European Union. However, when it comes to the rule of law, this line of reasoning is flawed.
For the European Union, the rule of law is, above all, a holistic construct. The harmonisation of legislation creates a regulatory framework, its practical application gives it real substance, and the consistency and irreversibility of reforms build trust in the institutions.
Thus, in negotiations on EU accession, the rule of law is not a ‘chapter’ or a set of formal criteria, but a test of trust towards the state. It is not only the pace of the negotiations that depends on how Ukraine performs in this test, but also the quality of the state we are building.
Therefore progress in the area of the rule of law shapes the whole course of the negotiation process – and there can be no compromises here.
Cluster 1 (Fundamentals): the Core of the Negotiations
Within the EU negotiation framework, matters relating to the rule of law are concentrated in Cluster 1 – Fundamentals. This cluster is the first to be opened and the last to be closed – and it is this cluster that sets the pace of progress in all other areas of the negotiations.
Should the situation regarding the rule of law deteriorate, the European Union may suspend progress on other clusters or reassess the progress already made.
Cluster 1 is therefore not a technical stage, but rather the structural core of the negotiation process, forming trust in the state as a partner capable of ensuring sustainable reforms. At the same time, this role is often underestimated in Ukraine – it is perceived as one of many negotiation clusters, rather than as an element critical to the entire process.
What in this Process is Unconditional and not Open to Negotiation
During the EU accession process, negotiations inevitably come down to the central question: which baseline requirements regarding the rule of law are non-negotiable.
Above all, they include independent courts, whose judgments are enforced by the state even when they are ‘inconvenient’ for it. Such independence must be backed by effective safeguards – judges must be protected from pressure, disciplinary procedures must not be applied selectively, and court decisions must be enforced without fail.
It is equally important to ensure the predictability of justice, where the same rules apply to everyone regardless of status, position or political expediency.
Effective anti-corruption mechanisms are of particular importance. This is not merely a question of having institutions or formal procedures in place, but rather of the state’s actual ability to prevent abuses of power, detect such offences and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable without discrimination.
Accountability of the authorities and effective legal protection are also crucial components. The question is whether citizens have a genuine opportunity to appeal against unlawful decisions by public authorities in an independent court, to exercise their right to have such decisions reviewed, and ultimately to secure enforcement of the court decision.
This is not an exhaustive list, but these elements form the foundation of the rule of law – not as an abstract value, but as the day-to-day practice of interaction between citizens and the state.
The Experience of Candidate Countries: What It Means for Ukraine
For Ukraine, the experience of candidate countries in accession negotiations is just as important as the enlargement methodology itself. After all, these examples demonstrate how the EU distinguishes between formal progress and real change in practice, and what factors influence the future course of the negotiations.
Croatia serves as a notable example. Indeed, while implementing Chapter 23 (which is now part of Cluster 1, Fundamentals), the country faced requirements that were, at the time, unprecedentedly stringent by the standards of the accession process. The European Commission assessed not only the adoption of laws, but also the first convincing outcomes of their application – the independence of courts, genuine anti-corruption investigations, judgments in high-profile cases, and the efficiency of the public prosecutor’s office. Consequently, at the final stage, the key factor was not the formal fulfilment of the criteria, but the state’s ability to demonstrate a consistent track record of their implementation. This practical capacity ensured the successful completion of the negotiations.
At the same time, the Croatian case revealed a structural weakness of the previous enlargement methodology, which did not ensure the sustainability of reforms following accession, despite formal compliance with the criteria. This experience was taken into account in the subsequent evolution of the European Union’s negotiation methodology and the shift towards enhanced conditionality in the area of the rule of law – with an emphasis on long-term assessment of practices, convincing outcomes of the application of the law, and the preservation of progress achieved prior to accession.
Montenegro’s experience has shown otherwise: even a country that has long been a leader in the negotiation process may fall behind if the rule of law is no longer a domestic political priority.
Having commenced accession negotiations back in 2012, the country was the first among the Western Balkan states to open Chapters 23 and 24 – which are key to the rule of law – and demonstrated steady progress towards European integration for several years. However, towards the second half pf the process, it became clear that formal harmonisation of legislation was not a sufficient condition for further progress. In the absence of consistent political will and convincing outcomes in the application of the legislation, progress in the area of the rule of law is gradually losing momentum.
Albania took a different path – a difficult but systematic one. Judicial reform, initiated in 2016 with the adoption of constitutional amendments and the launch of a large-scale vetting of judges and prosecutors, envisaged a profound institutional overhaul of the judiciary and deliberately permitted a temporary slowdown in its functioning – as the price to pay for the long-term purification of the system. However, the consistency and irreversibility of these changes proved to be key factors in building trust that the state would be able to ensure the sustainability of the reforms.
The experience of candidate countries therefore supports the conclusion that harmonisation of legislation is a necessary step, but does not in itself guarantee success. Even the progress achieved can be lost, and complex institutional decisions sometimes become a necessary investment in long-term trust. Consequently, the key factor in negotiations is not the mere fact of change, but its sustainability over time.
Ukraine: Under Scrutiny
Today, Ukraine is not lagging behind in the negotiation process. At the same time, it is under closer scrutiny than most candidate countries due to the size of the country, the ongoing war, and its own ambitious goal of rapid progress towards membership.
After the opening of negotiations, Ukraine shifted from political declarations to the establishment of a domestic reform framework in the area of the rule of law. In May 2025, the Rule of Law Roadmap was adopted. It is a strategic document setting out a clear list of legislative, institutional and practical changes.
The target date for its implementation is set for the end of 2027. This is an ambitious deadline that requires not only technical work but also strong political will, coordinated efforts from all key stakeholders, institutional leadership, and willingness to take responsibility for complex and often politically sensitive decisions.
War is Not a Reason to Put Off Change
War inevitably forces a country to prioritise its objectives. One of the most difficult challenges is ensuring the continued implementation of rule of law reforms during a prolonged period of martial law.
The European approach is based on the opposite premise: war cannot be used as a justification for backsliding in the area of the rule of law. On the contrary, such extreme challenges make these standards all the more crucial. In times of war, the state naturally gains expanded powers. Consequently, issues of accountability, oversight and legal certainty become paramount.
For Ukraine, this means that the implementation of the Rule of Law Roadmap must be a genuine political priority for all the state authorities. This involves not only the responsibility of the government as the body that adopted it, but also the coordinated involvement of parliament, the justice sector institutions and other agencies that influence the quality and pace of its implementation.
In these circumstances, judicial reforms should be viewed not as an additional burden, but as the institutional foundation of national resilience.
Public Trust as the Ultimate Membership Criterion
Taking a holistic view of the process of European integration, we can see that it is not merely a matter of a declared political course. It is a process of daily choices – in legislation, in its application, and in the state’s attitude towards its citizens. These choices shape the actual path towards the European Union and determine the level of trust in the state – both domestically and from the EU perspective.
Ultimately, it is the internal dimension of trust that proves decisive. It is shaped not by reports for partners, but by citizens’ day-to-day experience of interacting with the state. It flourishes when there is independent judiciary, when the rules are the same for everyone, when those in power do not sidestep accountability, and when the rule of law is no longer an external requirement but becomes a social imperative. At that point, the rule of law becomes an internal choice.
For Ukraine, this means one fundamental thing: European integration will not happen ‘on credit’. It depends on whether reforms become a domestic choice for the state. This is the point where compromises end and trust begins.
Oksana Tsymbrivska, Team Leader at EU Project Pravo-Justice
The text was first published in Ukrainska Pravda.